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OCI No. 0506/66

Copy No. 44

*[Handwritten signatures and initials]*

**BIWEEKLY REPORT**

**COMMUNIST STATEMENTS REGARDING INTERVENTION  
IN VIETNAM AND POSSIBLE NEGOTIATIONS**

**15 March 1966**

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GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and declassification

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Washington 25, D. C.  
15 March 1966

**MEMORANDUM**

Attached is a compilation of Communist statements on possible direct military intervention in the Vietnam situation, and on possible negotiations toward a settlement, received since our last biweekly report (OCI No. 0505/66) issued 28 February 1966.

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SUMMARY

NEGOTIATIONS

INTERVENTION

USSR Moscow has not changed its position on the question of negotiations during the past two weeks.

The Soviet Union's public expression of support for the DRV have given no indication of any shift in Moscow's position.

China Peking continues to oppose any negotiated settlement of the Vietnam conflict except on the Communist terms.

While repeating standard Chinese pledges of "firm support" for the Vietnamese public Chinese statements continue to imply that Peking will not take the lead in provoking a war with the US.

DRV The North Vietnamese position on bringing the war in South Vietnam to a negotiated conclusion has not changed in the past two weeks. The Hanoi leadership continues to emphasize that the US must "recognize" the DRV Government's four-points and prove it by actual deeds if a settlement is to be achieved.

Hanoi has made no significant statements of the issue of intervention during the past two weeks.

NFLSV While the Front has made no significant statements on the negotiations issue during the last two weeks, there is no evidence that there has been any change in its position on settling the war.

The Front has made no significant statements on the subject of intervention during the past two weeks.

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COMMUNIST STATEMENTS ON INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM

Selected Soviet Statements on Intervention

Selected Soviet  
Public Statements

Selected Soviet  
Private Statements

Comments

26 February 1966: A Radio Moscow commentary noting that Soviet aid has been "increasing in scale" in the past year adds that the USSR is doing everything to deliver arms as quickly as possible, and that the DRV "now has the means to repel American air pirates."

Moscow's public expressions of support for the DRV have given no indication of change in Moscow's position.

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[REDACTED]

CPSU party chief Brezhnev stated that no military solution was possible because socialist aid would preclude a US victory. He added that if "US "aggression" continued it would cause a serious regression in US-Soviet relations.

This statement by the CPSU First Secretary does not alter the nature of Moscow's past pledges of "support" to the DRV.

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10 March 1966: TASS quoted from a recent issue of Life Abroad which stated that the Soviet Union "deems it to be its international duty to render all the necessary assistance to the Vietnamese people, not only moral, but material, too."

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Selected Chinese Communist References to Intervention

Selected Chinese  
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28 February 1966: The Chinese Vice Minister of Culture declared at a Peking banquet that "The 650 million Chinese people will struggle side by side with the Vietnamese people until final victory, no matter what storms may arise."

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The latest in Peking's general pledge of support for the Vietnamese.

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11 March 1966: A Chinese Foreign Ministry statement "condemning" the despatch of an additional 20,000 South Korean troops to Vietnam asserts that "The Chinese people firmly support the Vietnamese people in carrying their heroic struggle against US aggression and for national salvation through to the end."

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COMMUNIST STATEMENTS ON NEGOTIATIONS IN VIETNAM

Selected Soviet Statements on Negotiations

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public Statements

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Private Statements

Comments

23 February 1966: When the US ambassador to Laos in a conversation with his Soviet counterpart criticized Soviet Party Secretary Shelepin's statement of support for the NLF as the "sole legitimate representative of South Vietnam," the Soviet ambassador replied that Moscow had always supported this thesis. He added, however, that "perhaps others than 'peoples representatives' could participate in negotiations and that this would not be ruled out by Shelepin's statement" [redacted]

In any event, the Soviets have made it abundantly clear that they are not presently calling the tune on negotiations. Moscow will in all probability continue to publicly support Hanoi's position on negotiations. Soviet officials have also indicated privately that they will not again attempt to convince North Vietnam to alter its line until they are convinced there is a clear chance of success.

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2 March 1966: TASS International Service reiterated Moscow's public support for "the position of the DRV Government and the program of the NLFV on the question of a settlement in Vietnam as conforming to the Geneva agreements and corresponding to the interests of peace in southeast Asia."

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Selected Soviet  
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tion to Vietnam. Kosygin observed that the door to negotiations was not open at present and that Moscow could take no initiative in that direction. 

Kosygin's remarks further emphasize that Moscow is unwilling to take any initiative without North Vietnam's approval and that Hanoi at this time does not intend to enter into negotiations. The Soviet leaders are sensitive to any possibility of adding weight to Chinese changes of "collaboration with the US and its "peace offensive."

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This statement is consistent with Moscow's longstanding public position that a settlement can come about only on the basis of the DRV's four points.

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3 March 1966: In an article describing the "quarrel" between the "hawks" and the "doves" over US policy in Vietnam, the People's Daily declares that "there is no fundamental difference of opinion between them," that both "oppose the immediate withdrawal of US aggressor troops from Vietnam," and are against recognizing the Liberation Front "as the sole representative of the South Vietnamese people," and that "In the final analysis only the complete victory of the Vietnamese people in their struggle to resist US aggression and to save the country will settle the issue for them."

Peking continues to oppose a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam problem except on the Communist terms

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Selected North Vietnamese References to Negotiations

Selected DRV  
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Private Statements



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reportedly stated that the North Vietnamese viewpoint on settling the war "encompasses the four points of Ho Chi Minh, North Vietnamese President."



these personnel generally stick closely to the stated Hanoi position on settling the war. Any deviation from the accepted line is usually minor and as a rule quickly rectified.

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25 February 1966: A spokesman of the DRV Foreign Ministry issued a statement on the discussion between the DRV charge in Moscow and Prime Minister Wilson's special representative, Lord Chalfont. The spokesman claimed that the charge clearly explained to the British diplomat that "the four-point stand of the DRV Government was a stand of peace, fully conforming to the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam, and stressed that the South Vietnam National Liberation Front is the sole authentic representative of the South Vietnamese people."

This restatement of the standard Hanoi position on settling the war was apparently designed to refute reports in the Western press that the discussions in Moscow had led to some change in the North Vietnamese position on bringing the war to a negotiated conclusion.

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Selected DRV  
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26 February 1966: Do Xuan Sang, secretary general of the Vietnam Lawyers Association in a recent article broadcast by VNA stressed that it was absurd for the US not to recognize the NFLSV "as the sole legitimate representative of the South Vietnamese people." He further stated that "President Ho Chi Minh has rightly pointed out in his message to the heads of state on 24 January that if the US really respects the Geneva agreements, it must withdraw all US and satellite troops from South Vietnam; if it really wants peace, it must recognize the NFLSV as the sole genuine representative of the people of South Vietnam, and enter into negotiations with it; if it really respects the right to self-determination of the people of South Vietnam it cannot but approve the program of the NFLSV."

This article appears to be an indirect response to the current debate in the US on American policy objectives in Vietnam. As such, it firmly re-emphasises the position of the Liberation Front in any settlement of the war. This particular point has evolved as the crux of the negotiations issue.

28 February 1966: A joint communique signed at the conclusion of the visit of a delegation of the Japanese Communist Party to North

Throughout the past years Hanoi has entertained delegations from several Communist parties. These delegations have in turn joined with the

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Selected DRV  
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28 February 1966 Cont'd: Vietnam voiced "unreserved support for the just struggle of the Vietnamese people and full support for the four-point stand of the DRV Government and the five points in the statement of the NFLSV on 22 March 1965." [redacted]

Vietnamese in condemning US "imperialism" and supporting the four-points. Such support in the eyes of the Vietnamese Communists threatens to bolster their contention that there is world wide support for their position.

1 March 1966: In a speech marking the first anniversary of the Indochinese Peoples Conference Hoang Quoc Viet, Presidium member of the Vietnam Fatherland Front central committee stated that "The Cambodian and Laotian people strongly condemn the schemes and acts of the US imperialists in stepping up and expanding their aggressive war in South Vietnam, and their escalation war to sabotage the DRV, expose their deceitful peace allegations, and wholeheartedly support the four-point stand of the DRV and the five-point statement of the NFLSV."

Viet used this occasion to emphasize the "solidarity" that exists among the peoples of the Indochinese peninsula with regard to the war against imperialism.


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